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THE “OTHER” PARENT: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF 




Decades of legal jurisprudence have shown that the right to raise 
one’s children as one sees fit is a fundamental right.1  As the legal 
system and society have changed, however, both the definitions and 
roles of parents have changed.  The increasing prevalence of divorced 
parents in particular has led to the need for legal custody and visitation 
arrangements.  The result of these changes has been the creation of the 
legal entity known as the “noncustodial parent,” the rights of which have 
yet to be concretely defined.2  The term noncustodial parent refers to a 
natural parent who does not have primary custody,3 including parents 
who have regular visitation with their children as well as those who do 
not. 
Of the many areas in which the rights of noncustodial parents are at 
issue, perhaps one of the most difficult are those situations involving 
state intervention to protect the welfare of the child.  When the custodial 
parent becomes the subject of removal proceedings based on allegations 
of child abuse or neglect, child welfare officials face the novel question 
of the role noncustodial parents are to play in these situations.  Cases 
involving emergency removal of a child based on an imminent danger of 
serious bodily harm are particularly problematic because questions of 
notification of, and objection by, the noncustodial parent become an 
issue. 
Consider, for example, a situation in which a couple gets married, and 
the marriage produces a female child.  The couple subsequently 
divorces, and although the divorce decree awards sole physical custody 
 *   Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 2009–2010. 
 1. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), overruled as stated in Gen. Conference Corp. of 
Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 
(1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 2. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1461 (2006). 
 3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (3d pocket ed. 2001). 
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of the child to the mother, the father retains some right to visitation of 
his daughter.  Years later, the mother remarries, and the daughter reveals 
to police officers that her mother’s new husband—her stepfather—has 
been violent toward her and has engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct 
with her.  Based on the child’s statements, a police officer decides that 
emergency removal of the child from the mother and stepfather’s home 
is necessary because she is at risk of imminent harm.  What duty, if any, 
does the police officer have to notify the child’s father of her removal?  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this question in Burke v. 
County of Alameda,4 discussed below. 
As yet, courts have done little to clarify the rights and roles of 
noncustodial parents in these types of situations, leaving law 
enforcement and child welfare officials without any meaningful 
guidance.  In late 2009, however, the Ninth Circuit declared that 
noncustodial parents have an interest in the “companionship, care, 
custody, and management” of their children that is implicated in 
emergency removal situations.5  In determining that the noncustodial 
father was entitled to have a jury determine whether his rights had been 
violated by the emergency removal, the court seemed to imply that 
noncustodial parents should play a role in emergency removal 
situations.6  The court did not specify what actions state officials must 
take to ensure that noncustodial parents’ rights are protected, however, 
and other circuits have similarly failed to articulate workable standards 
for these situations. 
This Comment argues for clearer legal standards regarding the rights 
of noncustodial parents in emergency removal situations.  Part II 
provides background information regarding the termination of parental 
rights, including the constitutional foundation of the “right to parent” 
and the process by which parents’ rights are terminated.  Part III 
specifically examines emergency removal, focusing on the standards by 
which the appropriateness of such removal is measured.  Part III also 
examines abuse of emergency removal authority and qualified immunity 
issues that accompany claims of abuse.  Part IV analyzes the court cases 
addressing the parental rights of noncustodial parents and the 
ambiguities that exist with regard to noncustodial parents’ due process 
rights in emergency removal situations.  Finally, Part V advocates that 
other circuits follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead in Burke7 and articulate the 
rights of noncustodial parents.  Part V also recommends that states 
 4. Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 5. Id. at 733. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. 
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recognize noncustodial parents as the primary placement option in 
emergency removal situations—both statutorily and in child protective 
services’ policies.  This Comment ultimately concludes that the Ninth 
Circuit’s Burke decision was important in terms of clarifying the rights 
of noncustodial parents, and that state courts, legislatures, and executive 
agencies need to expand on that foundation to adequately protect the 
rights of noncustodial parents. 
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 
RIGHTS 
This Part examines states’ authority to terminate parents’ rights to 
their children.  Subpart A explores an individual’s constitutionally 
protected right to parent and the way that right is implicated in 
termination proceedings.  Subparts B and C then provide background 
information on the termination of parental rights: B addresses states’ 
processes for terminating those rights; C discusses the grounds on which 
termination is justified. 
A. The Constitutional Right to Parent 
Although it is not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the 
right of a person to have and raise children is generally considered 
fundamental.  The foundation for this right, referred to generally in this 
Comment as the “right to parent,” has been solidified by the Supreme 
Court, and the integrity of the family unit has found protection in 
various constitutional provisions, including the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,8 the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,9 and the Ninth Amendment.10  In its decisions 
regarding the right to privacy, the Court has determined that the right 
ensures that there are certain areas of one’s life into which the 
government cannot intrude.11  The Court’s various decisions have 
emphasized that adults have the right to use contraceptives,12 choose to 
have an abortion,13 live with whichever family members they choose,14 
 8. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 9. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965). 
 11. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 12. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.  See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding the right 
applies to unmarried as well as married couples). 
 13. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 14. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
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make decisions regarding the education of their children,15 and generally 
raise their children as they see fit.  The Court has emphasized that “the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in parents, whose 
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder.”16 
The overall tenor of the Supreme Court’s family law jurisprudence 
with respect to the right to parent and, more specifically, the termination 
of parental rights has been that parents have a fundamental, 
constitutionally-protected interest in the continuity of the legal bond 
with their children, and the Court has placed a high value on the 
integrity of the family.17  With regard to the termination of parental 
rights specifically, the Court stated in Santosky v. Kramer:18 
 [t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply 
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody 
of their child to the State.  Even when blood relationships are strained, 
parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of 
their family life.19 
The Santosky Court not only recognized the fundamental liberty interest 
parents have in raising their children, but also emphasized that parental 
rights cannot be terminated without respecting the parents’ procedural 
due process rights.  Specifically, the Court determined that, if anything, 
“persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a 
more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state 
intervention into ongoing family affairs.  When the State moves to 
destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with 
fundamentally fair procedures.”20 
While the Santosky Court did not set out definitive procedural 
requirements for ensuring that parents’ due process rights were 
protected, it did indicate that any analysis of what process is due is the 
same in cases involving parental rights as in other cases.  Specifically, 
the Court cited the “three distinct factors” set out in Mathews v. 
 15. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), overruled as stated in Gen. Conference Corp. of 
Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 16. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 17. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that a parent has the primary 
responsibility to care for and nurture her children); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (holding that parents have the 
right to prepare their children to meet societal obligations and explaining that children are not “mere 
creature[s] of the state”). 
 18. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 19. Id. at 753. 
 20. Id. at 753–54. 
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Eldridge:21 (1) the private interests affected by the action; (2) the risk of 
error created by the state’s chosen procedure; and (3) the corresponding 
governmental interest in utilizing the challenged procedure.22 
In cases in which the government has a compelling interest in doing 
so, the state can restrict a person’s right to parent.23  Intervention into a 
situation in which a child’s safety may be at risk has traditionally been 
done under the government’s authority as parens patriae.  Literally 
“parent of the country” in Latin,24 this doctrine has historically stood for 
the concept that the state is responsible for providing protection to those 
who are unable to care for themselves.25  Specifically, the doctrine has 
been the basis for government intervention into situations in which 
citizens—primarily children—are unable to protect themselves.26 
This concept does not give the government an all-access pass with 
respect to inserting itself into, and terminating, the parent–child 
relationship.  Although the Supreme Court has not required that specific 
alternatives be employed, it has implied that immediate termination of 
parental rights in every case is not in keeping with the government’s 
parens patriae role: 
As parens patriae, the State’s goal is to provide the child with a 
permanent home.  Yet while there is still reason to believe that positive, 
nurturing parent–child relationships exist, the parens patriae interest 
favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds.  “[T]he State 
registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children 
from the custody of fit parents.”27 
While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed alternatives to 
termination, lower federal courts have held that the state must consider 
other options before terminating parental rights.28  These alternatives 
may include requiring parents to attend therapy with or without their 
children, requiring parents to take parenting classes, or helping parents 
 21. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 22. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754. 
 23. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“[A] state is not without constitutional 
control over parental discretion in dealing with children when [the children’s] physical or mental health 
is jeopardized.”). 
 24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (3d pocket ed. 2001). 
 25. Id. 
 26. It is interesting to note that parens patriae has also been employed to protect those with 
mental disabilities, so the government, when dealing with mentally ill parents whose children may need 
protection, may in fact have plausible grounds for protecting both the parents and the children.  In the 
context of the termination of parental rights, however, the government’s focus has most often been on 
the children. 
 27. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766–67 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972)). 
 28. See, e.g., Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Roe v. Conn, 417 F. 
Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
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slowly move toward regaining custody of their children through 
supervised visitation and regular in-home supervision by a case 
worker.29  Subpart II(C) discusses the efforts states may make to 
facilitate reunification of parent and child. 
Overall, while the courts have recognized that the state has a valid 
interest in protecting children from unfit or abusive parents, courts have 
also acknowledged that parental rights are significant and should only be 
permanently terminated in rare situations.  The Supreme Court has, 
through various decisions, recognized a person’s right to parent, and has 
held that the government must respect parents’ due process rights before 
interfering with the parent–child relationship.  Even operating in its 
capacity as parens patriae, the government has an obligation to consider 
less drastic options before severing the parent–child bond entirely. 
B. Process by Which a State Terminates a Parent’s Rights to a Child 
Termination proceedings generally begin with a “tip” from 
someone—often a concerned neighbor or a school official, physician, or 
other mandatory reporter30—who suspects abuse or neglect.31  
Following the report of suspected abuse, the local child protective 
services agency investigates the claim, and, if the investigation 
substantiates the claim, the child may be temporarily removed from the 
parent’s home.32  During the period in which the child is removed from 
the home, the court with jurisdiction will usually hold a series of 
hearings to determine the end result of the situation.33  Also during this 
interim period, the state is typically required to create a “reunification 
plan” and to provide the parent with services aimed at facilitatin
unification with the child.34 
 29. Courts have wide discretion in creating case plans for the reunification of parents with their 
children; these are merely a few of the options available to the court. 
 30. For a more in-depth treatment of mandatory reporters, see CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2010), 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/manda.pdf.  Most jurisdictions 
designate professions whose members are mandated by law to report child maltreatment.  Although it 
may vary by state, the list may include social workers, teachers and other school personnel, physicians 
and other healthcare workers, mental health professionals, childcare providers, medical examiners or 
coroners, and law enforcement officers.  Id. 
 31. See Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The Americans With Disabilities Act and the Parental 
Rights of People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1435 
(1995). 
 32. Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Termination of the 
Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 387, 402 
(2000). 
 33. Id.  See generally Watkins, supra note 31. 
 34. This requirement is discussed in more detail in the following subsection. 
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plans will remain in place until reunification is 
appropriate.37 
C. Grounds for the Termination of Parental Rights 
broad “unfitness” standard used by many states.40  In many states, long-
While reunification with the parent is always the goal, in certain 
situations it may not be feasible.  If, after a set amount of time, 
reunification has not occurred, the state can move to terminate the 
parent’s rights to the child.  In order to overcome the strong policy 
preferring reunification, the state must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that reunification is not, and will not be in the future, in the 
child’s best interest.35  Correspondingly, if a preponderance of the 
evidence shows that a child can safely return to the parent, or that 
progress has been made and reunification is likely to be possible in the 
future, parental rights will not be terminated.36  In the former situation, 
the parent and child will be reunited; in the latter, the removal and 
reunification 
The grounds for the state’s termination of parental rights arise from 
the specific circumstances under which a child cannot safely be returned 
to his parents because of the risk of harm by the parent or the parent’s 
inability to provide for the child’s basic needs.38  Because each state is 
allowed to enact its own legislation with respect to issues such as 
termination of parental rights, the specific grounds for such action vary 
from state to state; however, certain commonalities exist among the 
states.  In many states, the government can terminate parental rights in 
situations in which any of the following are present: (1) severe or 
chronic abuse or neglect; (2) abuse or neglect of other children in the 
household; (3) abandonment; (4) long-term substance abuse of the 
parents resulting in incapacity; (5) failure to support or maintain contact 
with the child; or (6) involuntary termination of the parental rights of the 
parent to another child.39  These various grounds often fall under the 
 
 35. Kerr, supra note 32, at 402.  See generally Watkins, supra note 31; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
, supra note 32, at 403. 
elfare.gov/ 
stem s_policies/statutes/groundterminall.pdf [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE INFO]. 
0), in which the Illinois legislature has set out eighteen factors, any one of 
U.S. 745 (1982). 
 36. Kerr
 37. Id. 
 38. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2010), available at http://www.childw
sy wide/law
 39. Id. 
 40. Some states do not provide a definition of “unfitness,” leaving the determination in such 
cases to the discretion of the judge hearing the case.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.116(1)(e) (West 2010); 
MINN. STAT. § 260C.301(b) (West 2010); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511(a)(5) (West 2010).  Other 
states provide specific definitions or parameters for “unfitness.”  See, for example, 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 50/1 D (West 201
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term mental illness or deficiency of a parent is also recognized as valid 
grounds for terminating parental rights.41 
Additionally, in some states, if a child has been in a placement outside 
of the parent’s care for a statutorily-defined length of time, and the 
parent has failed to correct the conditions which led to the child’s initial 
removal, that failure constitutes valid grounds for termination.  These 
grounds necessarily require that the state attempt to provide services to 
assist the parent in correcting the conditions that led to the removal of 
the child before terminating the parent’s rights.  Specifically, states are 
required to make reasonable efforts to reunite the parent and child by 
offering services to the parent.42  These “reasonable efforts” may 
include services such as counseling or other mental health services, 
substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, assisting with the provision 
of housing, or any other services realistically focused on meeting the 
parent’s and child’s needs.43  The state must be diligent in its efforts to 
implement the necessary services.44  To justify removal, the state must 
also prove that the parent did not benefit from the services, did not use 
the services, or was unlikely to benefit from the services.45 
The decision to terminate parental rights generally involves two steps; 
the court must find that: (1) there is clear and convincing evidence of 
parental misconduct or inability;46 and (2) the termination of parental 
rights is in the best interest of the child.  The aforementioned grounds 
for termination satisfy the first requirement.  In order for a court to make 
a determination as to the second step of the process, it should consider 
the child’s physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition as well as 
which can indicate unfitness. 
 41. CHILD WELFARE INFO, supra note 38.  See also, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.116(1)(e) (West 
2010); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301(b) (West 2010); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511(a)(5) (West 2010).  
Even in the absence of statutes specifically indicating that mental illness is a basis for an “unfitness” 
determination, courts often use the label of “mental deficiency” in making decisions about the 
termination of parental rights.  See, e.g., R.G. v. Marion County Office, 647 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 
995)
:5(IV) (2010); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW 
 384
992). 
ng parental rights is so “severe and irreversible.”  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 
1 ; In re Elijah R., 620 A.2d 282 (Me. 1993); In re K.F., 437 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1989). 
 42. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–28 (2006), which require states, in order to receive certain federal 
funding, to make reasonable efforts to keep the child with his or her natural parents.  Several state 
statutes impose a similar requirement.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (2010); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 260C.301 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C
§ -b (McKinney 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570 (2010). 
 43. See, e.g., In re Weaver, 606 N.E.2d 1011 (Ohio Ct. App. 1
 44. See, e.g., State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387 (N.H. 1978). 
 45. See, e.g., State v. Michael B (In re Michael B.), 604 N.W.2d 405 (Neb. 2000). 
 46. In Santosky, the Supreme Court held that the standard in termination proceedings must be 
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the
from their parents’ homes need not meet 
such a demanding standard. 
III. E R  
ines the 
rights of noncustodial parents in emergency removal situations. 
A. Emergency Removal Standards 
 child’s needs.47 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized a right to parent, it has 
also recognized that the right is not indestructible—it can be superseded 
by the state’s interest in protecting the welfare of minor children.  In 
those situations in which the state’s interest outweighs the parents’, the 
children can be removed and the parental rights terminated.  
Termination only happens upon a showing of unfitness, but the basis for 
initially removing children 
 MERGENCY EMOVAL
This Part specifically examines emergency removal, which occurs in 
situations in which a child’s safety is in imminent risk of harm.  Subpart 
A focuses on the standards by which the appropriateness of emergency 
removal is measured.  Subpart B then turns to an analysis of Burke v. 
County of Alameda,48 a Ninth Circuit case that specifically exam
Removal of a child from the home of his parents generally occurs 
after the local social services agency has conducted an investigation, 
evidence of abuse or neglect has been collected, and a judge has issued a 
court order for the child’s removal.49  In some situations, however, state 
officials find that circumstances exist in which the child is in imminent 
danger, and therefore needs to be removed immediately and without 
waiting for a court order.  Although emergency removal is permitted in 
 
 47. See, e.g., In re L.H., 511 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 48. Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 49. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[G]overnmental officials 
will not remove a child from his home without an investigation and pre-deprivation hearing resulting in 
a court order of removal, absent exigent circumstances.”) (citation omitted).  See also Hollingsworth v. 
Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Removal of children from the custody of their parents 
requires predeprivation notice and a hearing ‘except for extraordinary situations where some valid 
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.’”); Malik v. 
Arapahoe County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 191 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] parent has a liberty 
interest in familial association and privacy that [—absent extraordinary circumstances—] cannot be 
violated without adequate pre-deprivation procedures.”) (citation omitted).  But see Lossman v. 
Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288, 291–92 (7th Cir. 1983) (“When a child’s safety is threatened, that is 
justification enough for action first and hearing afterward.”) (citation omitted); Jordan by Jordan v. 
Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[O]nly where a child’s life is in imminent danger or where 
there is imminent danger of severe or irremediable injury to the child’s health (and prior judicial 
authorization is not immediately obtainable) may an official summarily assume custody of a child from 
his parents.”) (citation omitted). 
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ent will flee with 
This flexible, factor-based test 
gi
 removal of the children was necessary to protect 
th
 
ch situations, states have carefully crafted specific standards to ensure 
that it only occurs in true emergencies. 
In general, emergency removal is justified when the state official has 
reasonable cause to suspect the child is in immediate physical danger 
from which the state needs to protect him.50  Courts have determined 
that, in such situations, state officials are not required to wait to obtain a 
court order before removal when the child’s “life or limb is in immediate 
jeopardy.”51  Where “
ich the . . . abuse could [] continue[],” state officials are justified in 
removing the child.52 
In determining whether this type of emergency situation exists
ficials are to consider all relevant factors, including: 
whether there was time to obtain a court order . . .[,] the nature of the 
abuse (its severity, duration, and frequency), the strength of the evidence 
supporting the allegations of abuse, the risk that the par
the child, the possibility of less extreme solutions to the problem, and any 
harm to the child that might result from the removal.53 
Courts have been careful to emphasize that this list is not all-inclusive, 
however, and have emphasized that no one factor in particular ought to 
be given more weight than any other.54  
ves guidance to child welfare officials facing situations in which 
emergency removal may be necessary.55 
When parents initiate a court action challenging the actions of state 
officials in removing children from their homes in such emergency 
situations, the question of whether the officials’ actions were appropriate 
is generally one for the jury.  Where a court finds, however, that no 
rational jury could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the 
officials to believe that
em from immediate physical danger, the officials are entitled to 
summary judgment.56 
The policy rationale behind this result is simple.  The ultimate 
decision of whether to remove a child in a given situation rests, 
 50. P.C. v. Conn. Dep’t of Children & Families, 662 F. Supp. 2d 218, 230 (D. Conn. 2009).  See 
also, e.g., Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009); Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 
386, 389 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 51. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 605 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 52. Doe v. Conn. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs., 712 F. Supp. 277, 285–86 (D. Conn. 1989). 
 53. Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 429 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 54. See, e.g., id.; Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 398. 
 55. Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 400. 
 56. P.C. v. Conn. Dep’t of Children & Families, 662 F. Supp. 2d 218, 230 (D. Conn. 2009).  See 
also Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009); Wernecke, 591 F.3d 386. 
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its children from harm.   “When a child’s safety is 
threatened, that is justification enough for action first and hearing 
afterward.”59 
The Wallis court emphasized that any 
se r e 
pr
at the 
 parents’ due process rights was 
rea
interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their 
appropriately, on the shoulders of the official, and there is value in 
allowing the official to use her judgment with respect to whether 
removal is appropriate.  To prescribe certain actions that must be taken 
or certain conditions that must exist prior to removal could deter an 
honest official from taking action to protect a child who really is at 
risk.57  Such a result is directly contrary to the interest of the community 
in protecting 58
B. Burke v. County of Alameda 
In Wallis v. Spencer,60 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
recognized, as the Supreme Court has done many times,61 that parents 
and children have a constitutional right to live together and be free from 
governmental interference.62  
pa ation of parent and child requires the state to afford the parent du
ocess of law,63 and declared: 
 [o]fficials may remove a child from the custody of its parent without 
prior judicial authorization only if the information they possess at the 
time of the seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe th
child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of 
the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury.64 
Following the Wallis decision, courts acknowledged a two-prong 
standard for determining the appropriateness of emergency removal: (1) 
the state has reasonable cause to believe the child is in imminent danger; 
and (2) the scope of the intrusion on the
sonable in light of the circumstances.65  However, the Wallis standard 
was only applied to custodial parents.66 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit addressed the rights of noncustodial 
parents, recognizing that noncustodial parents have a reduced liberty 
 
 57. See Conn. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs., 712 F. Supp at 286. 
Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation 
mitte
). 
55 U.S. 745 (1982). 
, 202 F.3d at 1136. 
urke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 731–33 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 58. Id. 
 59. 
o d). 
 60. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000
 61. See Santosky v. Kramer, 4
 62. Wallis
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1138 (citation omitted). 
 65. See generally B
 66. See id. at 733. 
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d to any parent with legal custody—including noncustodial 
parents.69 
1. Background and Facts 
 aware of the abuse, but did not take 
ad
ict court granted 
summary judgment for the county and Officer Foster.78 
 
children.67  The court had not elaborated on the rights of noncustodial 
parents following that decision, however, until late in 2009 in Burke v. 
County of Alameda.68  The Ninth Circuit in Burke held that the Wallis 
test applie
Burke dealt with the emergency removal of a young woman, B.F., 
from the home of her mother and stepfather, the Burkes.  On July 12, 
2005, Officer Mark Foster of the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office 
interviewed B.F. because she ran away from home a few weeks earlier, 
and he wanted to discuss the circumstances surrounding the runaway.70  
During the course of the interview, B.F. disclosed that her stepfather had 
smacked her several times on the face when she returned home after 
having run away.71  B.F. also told the interviewer that her stepfather 
often made inappropriate sexual comments to her, and that he frequently 
pinched her buttocks and grabbed her breasts.72  B.F.’s comments 
indicated that her mother was
equate measures to stop it.73 
Based on these facts, Officer Foster removed B.F. from the Burkes 
and placed her in protective custody.74  Officer Foster did not seek a 
custody warrant before executing the emergency removal and did not 
contact B.F.’s biological father.75  B.F.’s noncustodial father found out 
about the removal two days afterward.76  B.F.’s mother and noncustodial 
father brought suit against both the county and Officer Foster under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Foster’s actions deprived them of their 
constitutional right of familial association.77  The distr
 67. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 68. Burke, 586 F.3d at 725. 
 69. Id. at 734. 
 70. Id. at 729. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 730. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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 established when 
it is “sufficien derstand that 
what he is doi
Officer Foster’
2. B.F.’s Parents’ § 1983 Claims Against Officer Foster 
Because qualified immunity is a defense to § 1983 claims against 
state officials, the test for determining whether a violation occurred 
involves two questions: first, did the defendant’s actions violate the 
Constitution; and second, was the right violated clearly established at the 
time of the defendant’s actions.79  If both questions are answered in the 
affirmative, the actor is not entitled to qualified immunity and can be 
held liable under § 1983. 
In the context of emergency removal, the question of whether the 
Constitution was violated also turns on a two-part analysis—the 
aforementioned Wallis test.  The Wallis test indicates that emergency 
removal is not unconstitutional if the state has reasonable cause to 
believe the child is in imminent danger, and the scope of the intrusion on 
the parents’ rights was reasonable given the circumstances.80  Here, if a 
jury were to find that Officer Foster had reasonable cause to believe that 
B.F. was in imminent danger and that the intrusion on B.F.’s parents’ 
rights was reasonable, the Constitution was not violated. 
If Officer Foster’s actions in this case did violate one of the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights, the § 1983 inquiry turns to whether the law 
protecting that right was clearly established at the time the actions were 
taken.  The Ninth Circuit has held that a law is clearly
tly clear that a reasonable official would un
ng violates that [constitutional] right.”81 
a. Reasonable Cause and Imminent Danger 
In B.F.’s case, the Ninth Circuit had little trouble finding reasonable 
cause for her removal.  B.F.’s parents attempted to argue that the state 
could not have had reasonable cause because B.F. was lying.82  The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that a victim’s report of 
abuse is compelling evidence.83  Such a statement provides the 
necessary “specific, articulable evidence” required to support a claim of 
reasonable cause.84  No rational jury, therefore, could conclude that 
s reliance on B.F.’s statement of abuse was 
 
 79. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
 80. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); Burke, 586 F.3d at 731–33. 
 81. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks, citation, and 
mpha
e, 586 F.3d at 731. 
 
e sis omitted). 
 82. Burk
 83. Id. 
 84. Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138.
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his been the sole basis for believing B.F. was in 
im
o rational jury could conclude that 




With respect to imminent danger, the police “must have reasonable 
cause to believe that harm will occur in the period of time it would take 
to procure a warrant and remove the child from the home.”86  In B.F.’s 
case, she reported that her stepfather’s sexual abuse occurred 
sporadically, so Officer Foster could have believed that she would again 
be sexually abused in the time it took to get a warrant.87  The court 
determined that, had t
minent danger, whether that belief was reasonable would have been 
for a jury to decide.88 
The threat of continuing sexual abuse was not the only basis for 
Officer Foster’s belief, however.  B.F. commented during the interview 
that things would be “worse for her” when she got home if her mother 
and stepfather knew what she had revealed to the police.89  She also 
described several threats her stepfather had made to beat her, and 
recounted the beating he administered when she returned home after 
running away.90  This additional threat of violence, combined with the 
threat of continuing sexual abuse, satisfied the imminent danger 
requirement, the court held, because n
nt danger of physical harm.91 
b. Scope of the Intrusion with Respect to B.F.’s Father92 
The question of whether the intrusion was reasonable with respect to 
B.F.’s biological father’s rights was one of first impression for the Ninth 
Circuit.  The court had previously acknowledged that noncustodial 
 85. Burke, 586 F.3d at 731. 
 86. Id. at 731–32 (citations omitted). 
t 732. 
ed the incident in which B.F.’s stepfather slapped her 
a g run away.  Id. at 730. 
 the 
reasonably necessary.  Id. at 733. 
 87. Id. a
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 729.  B.F.’s mother confirm
sever l times for havin
 91. Id. at 732. 
 92. The court concluded that the scope of the intrusion with respect to B.F.’s mother had been 
reasonable.  Id. at 733.  In circumstances in which the source of the abuse is not the biological parent but 
a stepparent, courts will sometimes place the child with the mother, but out of the presence of the 
abuser.  The Ninth Circuit determined in Mabe v. San Bernadino County, Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Serv., 237 
F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled by Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007), 
that “where the official reasonably believed that the mother was not protecting the child, ‘removal from 
the mother was reasonably necessary as well.’”  Burke, 586 F.3d at 733 (quoting Mabe, 237 F.3d at 
1110).  The court in Burke determined that because B.F.’s mother had not taken appropriate steps to stop 
the abuse of B.F., of which she had knowledge, and because she had accused B.F. of lying about
abuse, she was not protecting B.F., and the removal was therefore 
14
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ex
improper because rational juries could differ regarding whether Officer 
Foster’s actions w .101 
 immunity unless the law was so “clearly 
 
parents’ liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and 
management of their children is reduced.93  The court emphasized in 
Burke, however, that “even if [B.F.’s father’s] interest in B.F.’s 
companionship was somehow reduced, he was not without any interest 
in the custody and management of B.F.”94  As a result, the court 
tended the holding from Wallis to apply to all parents with legal 
custody, even if they do not possess physical custody of their children.95 
In the specific case at bar, the court determined that the 
reasonableness of Officer Foster’s intrusion on B.F.’s father’s rights was 
for a jury to decide.96  B.F.’s father was not accused of violence or abuse 
at any point in B.F.’s interview.97  B.F. had mentioned to the officers 
that she did not feel as though she were welcome in her father’s home, 
but never indicated she did not feel safe there or made allegations of 
abuse.98  The officers, however, did not at any point attempt to contact 
B.F.’s father, and did not explore the option of placing B.F. in his care 
instead of taking her into protective custody.99  In fact, two days passed 
before B.F.’s father had any knowledge of B.F.’s removal from her 
mother and stepfather’s home.100  The court held that granting summary 
judgment in favor of Officer Foster and the county on this aspect was 
ere reasonable under the circumstances
c. Officer Foster’s Qualified Immunity 
Because B.F.’s father had raised a triable issue of fact regarding 
whether his constitutional rights had been violated by Officer Foster’s 
actions, the court then examined whether Officer Foster was protected 
by qualified immunity.  Even when the actions of an official, acting 
under the color of state authority, violate the Constitution, the official is 
entitled to qualified
 93. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). 
al parent’s home without first attempting to place the child in the 
rent’s custody.  Id. 
 94. Burke, 586 F.3d at 733. 
 95. Id.  The court recognized that the Wallis test is a flexible one, and the individual 
circumstances of each case must be considered.  For example, if the noncustodial parent lives a great 
distance away, and the child is in imminent danger of harm, it might be reasonable for the official to 
remove the child from the custodi
noncustodial pa
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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es
 not have physical custody of B.F.   As a result, 
the court upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment with 
respect
constitutional rights to familial 
as
 
tablished” that a reasonable official would have known that his actions 
violated that right.102 
The Ninth Circuit determined that, because its previous cases referred 
only to the removal of a child from “the custody of its parent,”103 
Officer Foster’s actions were not inherently unreasonable, and he was 
therefore entitled to immunity.104  “Custody,” the court said, was never 
explicitly defined, and is commonly thought of as referring only to 
physical custody.105  Given this legal backdrop, the court was unwilling 
to say that it was clearly unlawful for Officer Foster and the other 
officials involved in B.F.’s removal to have failed to contact B.F.’s 
father because he did 106
 to Officer Foster.107 
3. B.F.’s Parents’ § 1983 Claims Against Alameda County 
The purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to remedy violations of 
constitutional rights by state officials.108  Section 1983 claims can be 
brought against both individual state officials and municipalities.  In this 
case, B.F.’s parents sued both Officer Foster and Alameda County for 
allegedly depriving them of their 
sociation by removing B.F. from her mother’s care without a warrant 
and without notifying B.F.’s father.109 
To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff “must show 
that (1) she was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the County had a 
policy; (3) the policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to her 
constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the 
constitutional violation.”110  The district court granted summary 
judgment to Alameda County because it found no constitutional 
violation.111  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision.112  The 
 102. Id. 
 103. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).  See also Mabe v. San Bernadino 
County Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled by Beltran v. Santa 
ir. 2007). 
e, 586 F.3d at 734. 
6 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992). 
arks and citation omitted), overruled by Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 505 
.3d
F.3d at 730. 
Clara County, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th C
 104. Burk
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Caballero v. Concord, 95
 109. Burke, 586 F.3d at 730. 
 110. Mabe v. San Bernadino County Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Serv., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation m
F  1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 111. Burke, 586 
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er court for 
a determination regarding whether B.F.’s father’s claim against the 
coun
t are 
unsure of how to do so.  This Part identifies the lack of identifiable 
standards . 
icitly found an existing and somewhat reduced liberty 
in
their children.  
court determined that B.F.’s father had raised a triable issue of fact 
regarding whether Officer Foster’s failure to contact him was a violation 
of his constitutional right to familial association.113  The summary 
judgment in Officer Foster’s favor was upheld because Foster was 
entitled to immunity, but municipalities are not entitled to qualified 
immunity.114  The Ninth Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the low
ty satisfied the other requirements of a § 1983 claim.115 
IV. THE UNDEFINED LEGAL RIGHTS OF NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS 
Although in Burke the Ninth Circuit clearly held that the rights of 
noncustodial parents must be considered in emergency removal 
situations, it is the only court to have done so.  Additionally, Burke 
merely recognized that noncustodial parents have an interest that needs 
to be protected in such situations; it did nothing in the way of suggesting 
how to afford that protection.  No other court has made such suggestions 
either, and the lack of guidance from the courts results in uncertainty for 
state officials who want to respect noncustodial parents’ rights bu
 and emphasizes the problems that arise in their absence
A. Most Jurisdictions Have Not Articulated Standards 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit addressed the rights of noncustodial 
parents, recognizing that parents who do not have primary custody retain 
a liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management 
of their children.116  The court also held that the “interest is 
unambiguously lesser in magnitude than that of a parent with full legal 
custody” because it has been reduced by the terms of the custody 
judgment.117  Other circuits have reached similar conclusions and either 
explicitly or impl
terest of noncustodial parents in the care, custody, and management of 
118
 
 112. Id. at 734. 
citing Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
akrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 1996); Franz v. United States, 707 F. 2d 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (
 115. Id. 
 116. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Z
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ng 
wh
g a child’s noncustodial parents in emergency 
re
riate action to protect those rights in 
emergency removal situations. 
 
Beyond acknowledging the existence of these rights, however, courts 
have largely been silent with respect to the specific rights of 
noncustodial parents.  With the exception of the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Burke, no other court of appeals has expressly recognized the 
relevance of the rights of noncustodial parents in emergency removal 
situations.  State officials therefore lack specific direction regardi
at actions they need to take to protect noncustodial parents’ rights. 
Like the courts, most legislatures and child protective services 
agencies have not acknowledged the rights of noncustodial parents or 
identified the specific steps that must be taken to protect those rights.  
Only one state statute requires consideration of the noncustodial parent 
as the primary placement option in emergency removal situations.119  
Other statutes call for initially attempting to place children with 
“qualified relatives” in such situations, but do not mention noncustodial 
parents.120  Similarly, a search revealed that policy manuals for child 
protective services agencies also fail to specify the actions that officials 
should take respectin
moval situations.121 
The lack of clarity regarding the rights of noncustodial parents creates 
confusion for state officials removing children from their homes in 
emergency situations.  In the absence of direction from legislatures, 
child protective services agencies, and the courts, the rights of 
noncustodial parents remain unclear, and therefore state officials are 
prevented from taking approp
582, 594–602 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1331–33 (10th Cir. 1981); Weller v. 
t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 394 (4th Cir. 1990); Terry v. Richardson, 346 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Dep’
Cir. 2003). 
 119. The Utah Code states, in pertinent part: “The following order of preference shall be applied 
when determining the person with whom a child will be placed in an emergency placement . . . : (i) a 
noncustodial parent of the child . . . ; (ii) a relative of the child.”  UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-
209(4)(a)(i)–(ii) (West 2010). 
 120. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.090(1) (West 2010), CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE 
§ 309 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3(a) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-251(C) (West 
2010). 
 121. See, e.g., N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHAPTER VIII: PROTECTIVE SERVICES, 
NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (2010), available at 
http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm-60/man/; OHIO DEP’T JOBS & FAM. SERVS., CHILD 
PROTECTIVE SERVICES WORKER MANUAL, available at http://emanuals.odjfs.state.oh.us/emanuals/ 
GetTocDescendants.do?maxChildrenInLevel=100&nodeId=%23node-id%28167%29; ALASKA DEP’T 
HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S SERVS., CHILD PROTEDCTIVE SERVICES (2008), 
available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/ocs/Publications/CPSManual/cps-manual.pdf.  A search revealed 
only one manual that contained specific direction regarding actions to be taken respecting noncustodial 
parents; that manual is discussed in Part V. 
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B. Problems Arising from the Lack of Standards 
The lack of clearly articulated standards poses several problems.  One 
significant problem is that, although courts have recognized the valid, 
constitutionally-protected liberty interests of noncustodial parents in 
familial association with their children, these rights are not being 
respected in emergency removal situations.  This problem stems from 
the absence of standards articulating the actions officials must take to 
respect noncustodial parents’ rights in such situations. 
As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Burke, “even if [B.F.’s father’s] 
interest in B.F.’s companionship was somehow reduced [because he is a 
noncustodial parent], he was not without any interest in the custody and 
management of B.F.”122  Constitutional violations are not viewed in 
terms of the value of the right or the strength of the liberty interest 
involved; there is either a violation of a constitutionally-protected right 
or there is not.  In the case of noncustodial parents, the right to make 
decisions with respect to the care, custody, and management of their 
children, however diminished, is violated whenever they are not 
afforded due process in emergency removal situations.  Articulated 
standards are necessary to ensure that the rights of all concerned parties 
are protected. 
A second and closely related problem stemming from the lack of clear 
standards of action in cases involving noncustodial parents is that 
officials are uncertain regarding what actions to take.  One option, of 
course, is to continue executing emergency removals according to 
existing procedures.  This is problematic, however, because in many 
situations the existing procedures ignore the rights of noncustodial 
parents entirely. 
In the alternative, officials concerned with protecting the rights of all 
parties involved, including noncustodial parents, may hesitate before 
taking necessary action to remove a child from imminent danger.  That 
is, officials may delay removal until the noncustodial parent can be 
contacted, in which case the child will likely be placed back in the 
custody of the custodial parent, where the risk of harm originally arose.  
Such a result, as previously discussed, is not in the best interests of the 
community.  The entire purpose of emergency removal is to protect 
children from harm; if officials hesitate in executing such removals for 
fear of violating noncustodial parents’ rights, that purpose is not being 
served.  If clear standards were articulated, however, officials would not 
have to concern themselves with violating any party’s rights because 
they would be following procedures designed to protect the interests of 
 122. Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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er “clearly established” 
enough to support a § 1983 claim against the individual state actors.  
T  






A third and final problem that arises from the lack of articulated 
standards relates back to the issue of qualified immunity.  Individuals 
whose constitutional rights have been violated by persons acting under 
color of state law can bring claims for remedies under § 1983.123  
Naturally, then, if noncustodial parents have constitutional rights to their
ildren that are violated in emergency removal situations, a § 1983 suit 
should provide them with a remedy.  The problem, however, is that 
individual state actors are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. 
As discussed in previous subparts, an official is entitled to qualified 
immunity unless the right violated was clearly established.  With the 
exception of the Ninth Circuit in Burke, courts have not clearly held that 
noncustodial parents are entitled to the same due process protections in 
emergency removal situations as custodial parents.  As a result, 
noncustodial parents bringing claims under § 1983 would have difficulty
oving that their rights were “clearly established.”  If officials cannot 
be held liable for their actions (or, in most cases, inactions) toward 
noncustodial parents, a § 1983 claim cannot function as it was intended. 
The lack of clearly articulated standards in this area of the law 
presents several problems.  Noncustodial parents have important 
interests in the “care, custody, and management” of their children, 
especially when a child is being removed from the custodial parent’s 
home.  These rights are largely ignored, however, in emergency removal 
situations.  The alternative, that officials delay action due to the 
uncertainty regarding noncustodial parents, is no better.  Additionally, 
§ 1983 cannot protect the rights of noncustodial parents against 
violations by state officials if the law is nev
he issue of noncustodial parents is not likely going away any time
 be addr d.
. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR PROTECTING NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS’ 
RIGHTS 
Articulated standards provide law enforcement and child welfare 
officials with guidance in emergency situations.  A lack of standards, 
correspondingly, creates confusion in those situations for officials.  This 
Part proposes changes that can be made and procedures that can be 
implemented in emergency removal situations in order t
ncustodial parents’ liberty interests in the care, custody, and 
 123. Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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e as those of custodial parents.  
Cl
nce for placement with 
no
 
management of their children.  These changes should occur in every 
branch of government—judicial, legislative, and executive. 
As an initial step, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead in 
Burke, and unequivocally hold that noncustodial parents have the same 
due process rights in emergency removal situations as custodial 
parents.124  Several courts of appeals have acknowledged, either 
explicitly or implicitly, that noncustodial parents have a protected liberty 
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.125  These 
courts have also held, however, that this interest is reduced by virtue of 
the parent’s noncustodial status.126  Although they have touted the 
existence of this reduced liberty interest, courts have largely been silent 
with respect to defining noncustodial parents’ rights further.  To begin to 
alleviate the confusion surrounding noncustodial parents’ rights, other 
courts should explicitly declare that the rights of noncustodial parents in 
emergency removal situations are the sam
ear definition by the courts of the constitutional rights of noncustodial 
parents will likely prompt the other branches of government to take 
steps to ensure protection of those rights. 
In addition to the need for court recognition of noncustodial parents’ 
rights, state legislatures need to statutorily acknowledge the propriety of 
considering placement of children removed in emergencies with their 
noncustodial parents before considering other placement options.  A 
survey of state statutes revealed that Utah is the only state to currently 
have such a provision.127  Utah’s statute lists the “order of preference” 
for placement of children in emergency situations, and lists noncustodial 
parents as the first option.128  Other state legislatures should include in 
their statutes similar provisions stating a prefere
ncustodial parents in emergency removal situations.  Leadership from 
the legislature on this issue may even prompt the other branches of 
government to make necessary changes as well. 
Finally, in the executive branch, child protective services agencies 
 124. Burke, 586 F.3d at 733. 
 125. Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 1996); Franz v. United States, 707 F. 2d 
582, 594–602 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1331–33 (10th Cir. 1981); Weller v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 394 (4th Cir. 1990); Terry v. Richardson, 346 F.3d 781, 784 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
 126. Swipies v. Kofka, 419 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he interest [of noncustodial 
parents] is subject to a de minimis exception . . . .”); Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“Such an interest is unambiguously lesser in magnitude than that of a parent with full legal 
custody.”); Zakrzewski, 87 F.3d at 1014 (“Zakrzewski’s liberty interest in the care, custody, and 
management of his son has been substantially reduced by the terms of the divorce decree” under which 
he is a noncustodial parent.). 
 127. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A–4a–209(4)(a)(i) (West 2010). 
 128. Id. 
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embers as a second placement 
op
the feasibility of immediate placement with a geographically distant 
noncustodial parent or the relative safety of placing the child with a 
on
need to establish concrete policies that accommodate the due process 
rights of noncustodial parents.  As alluded to in Part IV, many training 
manuals for child protective services agencies fail to indicate the actions 
that need to be taken with respect to noncustodial parents.129  Many of 
these manuals direct social services officials to first attempt to place 
children with relatives before considering outside placements such as 
foster care, but do not specifically direct the officials to contact any 
noncustodial parent of the child.  Iowa’s Department of Human Services 
Social Services Policy Manual, however, clearly directs state officials to 
consider any noncustodial parent as the first placement option when 
there is an emergency need for the child to be removed from the 
custodial parent’s home.130  The manual then directs state officials to 
attempt to locate other qualified family m
tion.131  Other child protective services agencies should similarly 
direct officials to first consider noncustodial parents as a placement 
option in emergency removal situations. 
States should follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
the Utah legislature, and the Iowa Department of Human Services Social 
Services Agency in order to secure protection for the rights of 
noncustodial parents in emergency removal situations.  More 
specifically, states should consider noncustodial parents as the first 
placement option following an emergency removal.  Officials would of 
course have to take into account the specific facts of each case, such as 
n custodial parent in lieu of another placement option.132  If the 
 
 129. See, e.g., N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHAPTER VIII: PROTECTIVE SERVICES, 
NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (2010), available at 
http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm-60/man/; OHIO DEP’T JOBS & FAM. SERVS., CHILD 
PROTECTIVE SERVICES WORKER MANUAL, available at http://emanuals.odjfs.state.oh.us/emanuals/ 
Manual/cps-manual.pdf. 





, if the parent without physical custody does not reside nearby, and a child is in 
GetTocDescendants.do?maxChildrenInLevel=100&nodeId=%23node-id%28167%29; ALASKA DEP’T 
HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S SERVS., CHILD PROTEDCTIVE SERVICES (2008), 
available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/ocs/Publications/CPS
 130. IOW
ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT INFORMATION (2006), available at 
anualPages/Manual_Documents/Master/17-b4.pdf. 
31. Id. 
32. In Burke, the Ninth Circuit was careful to note that 
the test in Wallis is flexible and must take into account the individual circumstances.  For 
example
imminent danger of harm, it is probably reasonable for a police officer to place a child in 
protective custody without attempting to place the child with the geographically distant 
parent. 
Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2009).  When determining the propriety of 
placement with a noncustodial parent, child protective services agencies would have to perform the 
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necessary change occurs in all facets of state governments, noncustodial 
parents will be the first consideration for emergency placements, and as 
a result their rights will be protected in these situations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At a time when divorce is remarkably commonplace and the concept 
of family has become fluid, it can no longer be assumed that all children 
reside with their biological parents, or even that both of a child’s 
biological parents are involved in the child’s life.  The constitutional 
rights of noncustodial parents with respect to their children are not the 
same as those of custodial parents, but despite the reduced interest in the 
“care, custody, and management” of their children, noncustodial parents 
are not completely without legally cognizable rights.  This is especially 
true in situations in which the state, acting as parens patriae, has 
determined that the custodial parent is unfit to care for—and is therefore 
unfit to retain custody of—the child.  In such situations, it would seem 
the noncustodial parent undoubtedly has a right to assume such custody 
of the child. 
While this may seem to be a logical conclusion, however, it is not as 
simple as it may appear, particularly given the numerous complexities 
related to the removal of children from their homes.  More specifically, 
in instances of emergency removal, in which a police officer or child 
welfare official believes that a child is at an imminent risk of serious 
harm in the home of the custodial parent, officials may need to make 
rapid decisions in the interest of the child’s safety.  The rights of the 
noncustodial parent may be overlooked in the face of these emergency 
situations. 
This Comment has argued that, absent clearer standards from 
government entities, the rights of noncustodial parents will continue to 
 
same background investigations to ensure that the placement is safe for the child.  See, e.g., N.C. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHAPTER VIII: PROTECTIVE SERVICES, NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (2010), available at http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm-
60/man/; OHIO DEP’T JOBS & FAM. SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES WORKER MANUAL, available 
at http://emanuals.odjfs.state.oh.us/emanuals/GetTocDescendants.do?maxChildrenInLevel= 
100&nodeId=%23node-id%28167%29; ALASKA DEP’T HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S 
SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES (2008), available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/ocs/Publications/ 
CPSManual/cps-manual.pdf.  These investigations would have to include not only criminal background 
checks but also the noncustodial parent’s history with the child, such as whether the noncustodial parent 
had ever been abusive toward the child.  A search revealed only one manual that contained specific 
direction regarding actions to be taken respecting noncustodial parents.  See IOWA DEP’T OF HUMAN 
SERVS., CHILD WELFARE SERV., EMPLOYEES’ MANUAL: ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT INFORMATION 
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/policyanalysis/PolicyManualPages/Manual_Documents/ 
Master/17-b4.pdf. 
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begins with the 
noncustodial parents; and child protective services agencies should 
create clear procedures that direct officials to consider noncustodial 
parents as the first placement option in those situations. 
 
be ignored in emergency removal situations.  The right of the state to 
conduct emergency removals is vitally important, as no child should 
have to suffer further abuse while officials are waiting to obtain a court 
order.  This Comment in no way advocates diminishing the state’s 
authority to act in that capacity.  What it does argue, however, is that the 
state should make reasonable efforts to place the child with the 
noncustodial parent.  Courts should therefore follow the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Burke v. County of Alameda133 and clearly state the rights of 
noncustodial parents; legislatures should indicate an order of preference 
for placements in emergency removal situations that 
 133. Burke, 586 F.3d at 725. 
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